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Summary
Cotton is one of the most important cash crops in sub-Saharan Africa that is almost exclusively 
grown by smallholder farmers. There are approx. 1.7 million cotton farmers in sub-Saharan Africa 
who grow cotton in rotation with the cultivation of food crops. Most African cotton farmers and 
their family members still live below the poverty line of 1.50 USD per day even though the cotton 
sector is relatively well organised and features a developed infrastructure with agricultural adviso-
ry services, research, seed development and established institutions in many parts of Africa. Com-
pared to other cotton producing regions in the world, the growing conditions in Africa also reveal 
a high level of biodiversity, the sustainable use of water (due to the practice of rainfed farming) 
and a comparatively modest use of pesticides. In this respect the African cotton sector offers good 
starting points for targeted policies for combatting poverty, securing food supply and for imple-
menting environmentally-friendly farming methods.  
The cotton sector in different countries of sub-Saharan Africa shows different organisational mod-
els, ranging from atomistic competition to monopolistic structures. The models differ in their type 
of service provision and purchase agreements offered to smallholder farmers. As a result there is 
an ongoing debate over which form of cotton sector organisation offers more benefits to the farm-
ers. This paper will contribute to the discussion in comparing different cotton sector organisation 
models according to well published indicators, namely their capability to reduce cotton contami-
nation, to provide inputs and to increase the yields and incomes of farmers. The paper will also 
expand on this ongoing debate by introducing new criteria for the evaluation of the efficiency of 
cotton sector organisation models, such as their capacity to stabilise purchase prices for farmers, 
their ability to combine cotton and food crop production and their capability to guarantee social 
and ecological sustainability to cotton textile buyers in the retail sector. 
The paper shows that contract farming based organisation models for the cotton sector provide 
better results than structures based on atomistic competition with respect to most of the criteria. 
On the other hand, however, it confirms that each country is well advised not to look for a stand-
ard blueprint, but to design its cotton sector organisation system while taking historically devel-
oped structures, practices and expectation and behaviour patterns of stakeholders into account.  
The empirical basis of this paper is comprised of many years of insight and experience gained 
through the Competitive African Cotton Initiative (COMPACI) programme. A rich panel data set 
from African COMPACI partners was analysed. The COMPACI programme endeavours to im-
prove the income and living conditions of around 500,000 African cotton farmers in seven coun-
tries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Cameroon).

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1 Introduction 
The development of the agricultural sector plays a key role in the fight against poverty and 
in securing the food supply in sub-Saharan Africa. Not only does agriculture account for 
65 per cent of the continent’s full time employment, for about 25–30 per cent of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) and over half of total export earnings, but growth originating 
from agriculture is also known to be twice as effective in reducing poverty as GDP growth 
originating outside of agriculture (IAASTD 2009a, 2; Yumkella et al. 2011, 17; World 
Bank 2008, 7). This is why the development of the agricultural sector plays a key role in 
most development strategies for sub-Saharan Africa (IAASTD 2009a; NEPAD 2009; 
World Bank 2008; AGRA 2009).
Smallholder farmers must be the backbone of this effort, as smallholder farms account for 
80 per cent of the agricultural economy in sub-Saharan Africa (IAASTD 2009b, 6). Im-
proving their productivity is therefore one of the key instruments in combating poverty. 
Higher productivity generates more income and reduces poverty for both farmers and non-
farmers. The increased purchasing power promotes a diversification of the local econo-
mies by creating jobs in commerce, small business and handcrafts. This also broadens the 
economic basis of social networks for supporting needy members of large extended fami-
lies (Wolz 2005, ii). 
While there is a broad consensus in the discussion surrounding developmental policies 
that the strategies for fighting poverty and for securing the supply of food should first and 
foremost start with promoting the production of smallholder farmers, controversy sets in 
when the question arises of what form this support should take (Wolz 2005, 19; IAASTD 
2009a, 2). The challenge of providing millions of smallholder farmers with advisory ser-
vices, high quality seed and other agricultural inputs, as well as organising their access to 
markets, is immense.
One approach for tackling this challenge is the creation of a link between smallholder 
farmers and the market through contracts with agro-industrial buyers. This system, which 
is known as contract farming, is well established for certain products in several sub-
Saharan African countries and is often the only opportunity for smallholder farmers to 
access advisory services and external inputs for agricultural production.1 Contract farm-
ing, however, is often criticised. It is argued that this model is disadvantageous for the 
farmers, as it is mostly limited to cash crops destined for export and thus might negatively 
affect the ability of the farmers to produce enough food. According to these critics con-
tract farming is contradictory to self-organisation among farmers, which in turn works 

1 “Contract farming describes pre-agreed supply agreements between farmers and buyers. Usually local 
farmers grow and deliver agricultural produce in the specified quantity and quality at an agreed date. In 
exchange the company provides upfront inputs, such as credit, seeds, fertilizer, pesticides and technical 
advice, all of which may be charged against the final purchase price, and agrees to buy the produce sup-
plied, usually at a specified price” (Vermeulen / Cotula 2010, 4). There is a wide range of contract farm-
ing arrangements, varying from loose verbal terms to highly specified contracts and designations as to 
which seed, fertiliser, pesticides and techniques must be used and when (Vermeulen / Cotula 2010, 39).  
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against any strengthening of farmers’ position. Furthermore, it prevents the farmers from 
being able to participate in any of the further processing steps in the value chain. NGO 
activists as well as liberal economist argue that farmers are likely not to receive a fair 
share of the world market price in contract farming arrangements (United Nations 2011; 
Brüntrup / Peltzer 2007, 42; Hoering 2007, 117).
Given this controversy it is appropriate to examine contract farming more closely. This 
paper does so by looking at the cotton (sub-) sector in sub-Saharan Africa, as in most Af-
rican countries this sector relies on contract farming in one form or the other, cotton is of 
significant economic importance for the continent and reaches a significant proportion of 
the rural population living in poverty. Though there are no precise figures on the number 
of cotton farmers and the size of area they cultivate in sub-Saharan Africa, conclusions 
regarding the relevance of the cotton sector within the agricultural sector in sub-Saharan 
Africa can be drawn based on data from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
and on data gathered through the Competitive African Cotton Initiative (COMPACI).2
According to FAOstat data cotton was planted on roughly 3.17 million ha in sub-Saharan 
Africa in 2009, which corresponds to app. 1.55 per cent of all agricultural land.3 In the 
COMPACI countries Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia 
and Cameroon, the proportion of agricultural land used for growing cotton is significantly 
higher (3.86 per cent).4 COMPACI data shows that the average cotton farmer has a total 
field size of six to seven hectares (ha), of which on average 1.9 ha are dedicated to grow-
ing cotton (NORC 2011, 8).
Several very rough calculations can be made from those figures. It is important to under-
stand them as approximations that can vary greatly from country to country. Nevertheless, 
the following data indicates the importance of the cotton sector in sub-Saharan Africa: 
First, it can be assumed that there are app. 1.67 million cotton farmers in sub-Saharan Af-
rica.5 Secondly, these cotton farmers cultivate roughly 10.86 million ha with cotton and 
food crops, which corresponds to 5.31 per cent of the agricultural land in sub-Saharan Af-
rica.6 Thirdly, this proportion is even higher in COMPACI countries, where cotton farmers 
cultivate app. 4.7 million ha of agricultural land, which corresponds to 13.22 per cent of 
the agricultural land in the COMPACI countries. 

2  A description of the COMPACI programme can be found in the last paragraph of this introduction and 
in the COMPACI Flyer (DEG / GTZ s.a.). 
3  Here and in the following, agricultural land only refers to arable land (farmland) and areas with perma-
nent crops. Permanent meadows and pastures are not included.  
4  The following figures were used for these calculations: cotton area in COMPACI countries was 
1,375,252 ha and agricultural land area in COMPACI countries was 35,585,000 ha in 2009 (FAO 
2012a and FAO 2012b). 
5  For this calculation the entire area cultivated with cotton (3.17 million ha) was divided by the average 
cotton field size (1.9 ha). 
6  For this calculation the number of cotton farmers (1.67) was multiplied with the average agricultural 
area of one cotton farmer (6.5 ha) to calculate the total cultivation area of cotton farmers. With 
204,683,700 ha of agricultural land in sub-Saharan Africa, this corresponds to 5.31 per cent.  
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Taking the average of 6.2 family members per household in COMPACI countries, 10.4 
million people in sub-Saharan Africa are estimated to depend on the cultivation of cotton 
to a significant degree in order to maintain their livelihood. 80 per cent of these cotton 
farmers and their family members had a per capita income of less than 1.5 USD per day 
when the COMPACI baseline study was conducted (NORC 2011, 8). 
The cotton sector is one of the most organised and structured agricultural sub-sectors 
in sub-Saharan Africa. The type of structure and regulation of the cotton sector, how-
ever, varies from country to country. In general, a distinction can be made between 
three different models: (1) a model with national or sub-national concession areas (na-
tional or regional monopolies), in which a cotton company has the monopoly rights to 
promote and buy cotton in a specified geographical area; (2) a concentrated competi-
tion model in which one or two dominant firms act as market leaders in a competitive 
market among much smaller competitors; (3) a competitively structured system in 
which many ginners (20–30) compete vigorously for a market share without anyone of 
them establishing a dominant position. While concession area agreements still domi-
nate in Western and Central African countries (WCA), which were formerly French 
colonies, more competitive systems are dominant in Anglophone Eastern and Southern 
Africa (ESA). The different organisational models also have an impact on the kind of 
contracts that are possible between firms and cotton farmers. Further explanations of 
the models and the different types of contract farming schemes are explained in Sec-
tion 2.
For many years there has been intense discussion, especially in several studies financed by 
the World Bank and French development cooperation, regarding the advantages and dis-
advantages of the various organisational forms of the cotton sector and the resulting de-
sign of contract farming arrangements for the living conditions of smallholder cotton 
farmers and for the performance of the cotton sector as a whole.7
This paper will contribute to this discussion in supplying additional empirical evidence on 
the efficiency of the different cotton sector organisational models using some of the 
known indicators from Tschirley et al. (2010), such as quality, provision of credit, produc-
tivity (cotton yield/ha) and farmer incomes from cotton. In addition to these it introduces 
new criteria for the evaluation of the different organisational models, such as their ability 
to stabilize cotton purchase prices and thus income for farmers, to integrate the promotion 
of food crops in the cotton extension service model and to facilitate the implementation of 
sustainability standards that are being demanded more and more by international retailers 
and consumers of cotton textiles.
The empirical basis of this paper is comprised of many years of insight and experience 
gained through the COMPACI program. The COMPACI programme endeavours to 

7  The following two essays summarise the studies that compare various organisation forms in the cotton 
sector: Poulton / Tschirley / Plerhoples (2010) and Tschirley et al. (2010, 295–323).  
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improve the income and living conditions of around 500,000 African cotton farmers in 
seven countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia 
and Cameroon).8 This programme is financed in part by the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation (BMGF) and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ). An independent evaluation of the COMPACI programme 
through the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) in Chicago began in early 
2009. The implementation of this programme and the evaluation performed by NORC 
has produced a large volume of data and findings that can contribute to the discussion 
outlined above.9
2 Conceptual and empirical approach
2.1 Organisational models of the African cotton sector 
The following typology and explanation of organisation models of the African cotton sec-
tor is modelled after Tschirley et al. (2010, 299), who differentiate between five organisa-
tional forms. For the sake of simplicity, state and regional monopolies have been com-
bined into one category and the hybrid system described by Tschirley et al. (2010, 299), 
under which Benin would fall, will not be discussed.10 A differentiation will therefore be 
made between the following three models:  
(1) The national or sub-national (regional) monopoly: In this model one company has 
the monopoly right to promote and buy cotton in specified geographical areas and farmers 
are therefore obliged to work with these state-run or private cotton companies. Thus, the 
cotton company “controls” all cotton production in a country or a concession area / region. 
National monopolies exist in Mali and Cameroon (state-owned cotton companies), Sene-
gal (private cotton company) and Togo (state-owned cotton company with minority shares 
held by farmers’ organisations), for example. In Mozambique and Burkina Faso, on the 
other hand, there are regional concessions areas, in which state-run or private cotton com-
panies have regional monopolies in specific areas.
(2) The concentrated competition model: In this competitive, market-based system a few 
strong private cotton companies dominate the greater part of the market. They act as mar-
ket leaders among much smaller competitors. Under this model cotton farmers may 
choose the cotton company with which they wish to enter a contract. This system exists in 

8  The above-named COMPACI programme currently includes 486,000 farmers in Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. There is also a public private partnership project, 
which is carried out by the Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH (DEG) and 
Sodecoton Cameroon, linked to the programme. Sodecoton has contractual relationships with 160,000 
farmers. 
9  The NORC data, however, only refers to the countries Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, 
Mozambique and Zambia. There is no NORC data available for Cameroon. 
10  Most recent information indicates that Benin will move “back” to a concession area model.  
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Zambia, Zimbabwe and, since recently, in Côte d’Ivoire, where the original concession 
area system has been phased out in favour of concentrated competition.11
(3) The atomistic competition model: In this competitively structured system a large 
number of cotton companies compete vigorously for a market share and for the smallhold-
er farmers’ cotton. None of them has established a dominant position. This system is prev-
alent in Tanzania and is being mandated by the government in Malawi.  
Since this paper is based on the experience and data of the COMPACI countries, Table 1 
classifies the COMPACI countries according to the above categorization.
Table 1: Typology of the organisation of the African cotton sector and the companies 
collaborating with COMPACI* 
National/ Regional Monopoly Concentrated Competition Atomistic Competition 
Cameroon
(Sodecoton)
Côte d’Ivoire 
(Ivoire Coton)a
Malawi
(GLCC)b
Mozambique 
(Plexus Mozambique)
Zambia 
(Cargill, Dunavant)
Burkina Faso 
(Faso Coton)
* Benin is not included in the categorization, as it falls within a hybrid system.
a = The cotton sector in Côte d’Ivoire was a monopolistic system for many years and only changed to concentrated 
competition in 2001. Therefore many characteristics of the monopoly system are still present as can be seen in 
the analysis in Section 3.  
b = GLCC has a strong presence in the Malawi market, but is confronted with atomistic competition when it comes to 
purchasing cotton. 
Source: own figure based on Tschirley et al. (2010, 299) 
2.2 Contract farming and the competition-coordination trade-off 
The different organisational models have an impact on the design of the contractual rela-
tionship between cotton companies and cotton farmers. Whereas contract farming ar-
rangements exist under the national or sub-national monopoly and within the concentrated 
competition model, there are no contractual relationships within the competitively struc-
tured system.  
In general, contract farming arrangements within the cotton sector imply that the cotton 
companies operating the gins for delinting the cotton pre-finance the seed and, in varying 
degrees, the inputs for cotton production like fertiliser, pesticides and sprayers, for the 
farmers. In some cases, in which stable, long-term contractual relationships exist between 
the cotton company and the contract farmers, investment goods, such as tractors, oxen, 

11 The commission currently in charge of reviewing the cotton and the cashew sector on behalf of the gov-
ernment considers moving back to a system with clearly defined concession areas, however.  
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ploughs and other agricultural equipment, can also be pre-financed. The companies also 
provide agricultural advisory services and play a role in the maintenance of rural roads. In 
return for pre-financing services, the farmers pledge to deliver their cotton to the cotton 
company. The purchase price for the cotton can either be set before the seed is planted or 
during the marketing season. Upon delivery of the cotton, the cotton company deducts the 
fees for the pre-financing services from the amount owed to the farmer. 
Under contractual models cotton companies provide agricultural advisory services through 
a relatively dense network of full-time extension workers and/or pilot farmers, who advise 
the farmers during the growing and harvest periods. In general, a ratio of one extension 
worker per 250–300 farmers can be considered as adequate. This is particularly true when 
pilot farmers with demonstration fields complement the services provided by the extension 
service from the cotton companies. With this number of extension workers available, the 
farmers are able to receive regular training in effective agricultural practices and harvest-
ing techniques to improve the cotton quality and to adapt as new seeds, technologies and 
conditions emerge.  
In the late 80’s and early 90’s the World Bank polemicised against the contract farming 
system with parastatal (monopoly) cotton companies developed since independence by the 
French government in WCA and pushed for privatisation through a number of structural 
adjustment programmes (Delpuche / Leblois 2011, 7). Their central concern was that the 
smallholder farmer does not receive a fair cotton purchase price because of the monopolis-
tic system, in which the price is not determined through competition. They argued for a 
competitive organisation model with free pricing. The French side, as well as governments 
in WCA, argued that the decisive criterion for assessing the performance of an organisa-
tional model was not the price per kg, but rather the farmer’s net profit per hectare. A mo-
nopolistic and/or concession system would allow farmers to pre-finance inputs of produc-
tion and investment goods in order to increase their productivity, so that after deducting 
the pre-financing costs the farmers would be left with a higher net profit, even if per kg 
prices would be lower under this system in order to pay for the large administrative and 
transaction costs. 
Meanwhile, the World Bank backed away from its liberalisation dogma and thus the fierce 
advocacy for a liberal organisation of the cotton value chain is no longer the focus of the 
debate. Still, there is an ongoing debate on the efficiency of the various organisational 
models in the cotton sector, which is at the same time a debate on the efficiency of con-
tract farming in general. This discussion is headed by the research performed by Tschirley 
et al. (2010, 295 ff.) and Poulton et al. (2010), who evaluate the organisational forms of 
the cotton sector along various indicators. Within their studies the perception that there is 
a trade-off between coordination (generally more present in WCA countries) and competi-
tion (prevailing in ESA countries) is still present and is discussed under the term “compe-
tition-coordination trade-off.” According to it the competitive market system is expected 
to deliver attractive cotton prices for the producer, but is rarely able to deliver inputs, cred-
its or to achieve high lint quality, while the concentrated market system allows for the de-
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livery of inputs, credits and achieves a high lint quality, but is expected to deliver lower 
cotton prices to producers than the competitive system over time (Tschirley / Poulton / 
Labaste 2009 in Poulton et al. 2010, 10 ff.). 
2.3 Analytical framework and empirical indicators 
Since the goal of this paper is to assess the advantages and disadvantages of the various 
organisational forms of the cotton sector and the respective design of contract farming 
arrangements for the living conditions of smallholder cotton farmers, indicators that 
measure the influence of the cotton sector organisation at the farm level must be chosen. 
Tschirley et al. (2010, 300) chose the indicators displayed in Table 2 to measure the cotton 
sector’s performance.  
Table 2: Indicators for cotton sector performance used by Tschirley et al. 
Type of indicator Measured by 
Quality and marketing 
Estimated national average realized premium 
over Cotlook A index (US$/lb lint), an index 
for market prices for African cotton 
Pricing Mean per cent price paid to farmers at local market place 
Input provision 
a) Per cent of cotton farmers receiving input 
credit
b) Adequacy / quality of input credit pack-
age, if provided 
c) Repayment rate 
Extension
a) Cotton companies providing assistance: 
yes or no 
b) Qualitative assessment 
Research  No. of varieties released and taken up, past 10 years 
Yield Kg of seed cotton produced per ha 
Consumer welfare Returns per day of family labour (US$/day) 
Overall competitiveness Ratio, total FOT cost to total FOT value 
Net impact 
a) Total value-added per capita (including 
value of seed sales) 
b) Net budgetary contribution per capita 
(taxes paid minus transfers received) 
Source: based on Tschirley et al. (2010, 300 ff.) 
For the purpose of this paper we dropped some of the indicators and introduced three new 
criteria for the discussion of the organisational forms of the cotton sector. Our list of indi-
cators can be seen in Table 3.
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Table 3: Indicators used in this study for the examination of cotton sector performance 
Type of indicator Measured by 
Quality  Level of contamination determined by expert opinion 
Access to credit 
a) Provision of input credits 
b) Provision of investment credits 
Yield Kg of seed cotton produced per ha 
Pricing Farmers share of world market price 
Income Net revenue of farmers per ha cotton 
Price stability Qualitative assessment 
Food production Qualitative assessment 
Environmental and social standards Qualitative assessment 
Source: own compilation 
The criteria were adapted due to the following facts and considerations: This paper is 
based on monitoring and evaluation reports presented by COMPACI partners between 
2007 and 2012 and on NORC surveys, which only report on access to credit, yields, pric-
es, income and, to some extent, quality aspects. Second, the new indicators, i.e. price sta-
bility, food production and environmental and social standards, play a major role in pre-
sent discussions on the living conditions of the smallholder farmers and/or their competi-
tiveness on the international market.
3 Cotton sector performance within the COMPACI countries 
3.1 Quality 
The quality of cotton is measured based on the characteristics of the cotton fibres and on 
the degree of contamination of the cotton with foreign substances, especially polypropyl-
ene. African cotton is known for some good characteristics in its cotton fibre based on a 
global comparison, but the degree of contamination of the cotton varies greatly throughout 
the continent (Tschirley et al. 2010, 303). 
Tschirley et al. (2010, 304) argue that the quality of the cotton (here always referred to in 
the context of non-contamination) is best under the concentrated competition model. This 
is because two main conditions need to be in place for a sector to produce high quality 
lint: (1) Ginners need to be able to control their supply chain, which means in practice that 
they are able to provide clear incentives for farmers to deliver uncontaminated and well 
sorted cotton; (2) ginners must have the incentive to do this. According to Tschirley et al. 
(2010, 304 f.) those two conditions are best met in a concentrated sector, because the con-
centrated system allows for the control of supply chains without becoming inefficient, 
which tends to be the case with monopolistic systems. Nevertheless, Tschirley et al. (2010, 
305) state that performance among monopolistic systems is highly variable, mostly depend-
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ing on the level of political interference. Atomistic competition models tend to completely 
negate quality aspects. They support this argument in part by pointing to the quality premi-
ums received by Zambian cotton over the Cotlook A Index (Tschirley et al. 2010, 303 f.). 
Zambian cotton has in fact, for African standards, a relatively high degree of non-
contamination, but it is questionable whether or not this is due to the organisational form 
of the sector. Insofar as the term quality refers to a low degree of polypropylene contami-
nation, the fact that farmers in WCA – despite all training – generally use polypropylene 
fertiliser bags during the harvest is the reason for the systematically higher degree of pol-
ypropylene contamination in cotton from WCA compared to ESA. Since farmers in ESA, 
with the exception of Zimbabwe, do not use mineral fertiliser, they don’t have these plastic 
bags available for “misuse” during the harvest. Additionally, Dunavant and Cargill Zambia, 
in particular, worked very hard to remove contamination. The cotton is fed into the gin on 
conveyors while women sit and manually remove foreign objects. In WCA, on the other 
hand, the cotton is vacuumed out of the delivery trucks and sent directly to the gin.  
It is also not as clear as Tschirley et al. (2010, 303) claim that the spinning mills demand 
non-contaminated cotton. There is, in fact, a demand for low quality cotton (for example 
for jeans, tissues etc.). Often it is also cheaper for the spinning mills to remove contamina-
tion themselves instead of paying higher prices to ginners or better quality. For this rea-
son, Dunavant is currently considering reducing its efforts to decontaminate, as the high 
costs are not completely compensated by the premiums that are paid for it. 
These explanations and the assessment of the cotton quality of the COMPACI partners in 
terms of non-contamination seen in Figure 4 show that a causal relationship between sec-
tor organisation and cotton quality cannot be easily identified. Regardless of the organisa-
tional form, all parties must find an answer to the question of quality (non-contamination) 
that is appropriate for their specific markets and production conditions. 
The introduction of polyethylene fertiliser bags in WCA would be a big step forward. This 
however was intensely discussed and then rejected for technical reasons years ago, primar-
ily due to the low stability and poor tear resistance of polyethylene fertiliser bags.
Table 4: Cotton quality and sector organisation 
Sector type Cotton company Quality
Monopoly 
SODECOTON (Cameroon) + 
Plexus (Mozambique) + 
Faso Coton (Burkina Faso) – 
Concentrated Competition Ivoire Coton (Côte d‘Ivoire) – 
Dunavant; Cargill (Zambia) ++ 
Atomistic Competition GLCC (Malawi) + 
– = Partly contamin. + = good ++ = very good 
Source: own assessments 
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3.2 Access to input and investment loans 
There is, however, a close link between the organisational form of the sector and its ability 
to provide credits. The following link can be made in principle: the stronger the bond be-
tween the farmer and the cotton company and the greater the extent to which side selling12
can be eliminated, the more comprehensive the services that the cotton company is willing 
to pre-finance for the smallholder farmers. The provision of credit is therefore generally 
better in monopolistic systems, which are traditionally prevalent in WCA, than in systems 
with concentrated competition or atomistic competition. The cotton companies that work 
in regional or national monopolies also experience – due to the system – very high repay-
ment rates, provided the cotton is not smuggled into neighbouring countries.  
Table 5, however, shows that there are a few country-specific exceptions, such as Ivoire 
Coton, which is able to provide very good input credits as well as investment loans under 
the system of concentrated competition, and Plexus Mozambique, which is rather poor in 
input credit provision even in a concession system. These two cases will be briefly dis-
cussed in the following.
Table 5: Credit supply and sector organisation 
Sector type Cotton company Input credits Investmentcredits 
Monopoly 
SODECOTON (Cameroon) ++ + 
Plexus (Mozambique) + – 
Faso Coton (Burkina Faso) ++ + 
Concentrated Competition Ivoire Coton (Côte d‘Ivoire) ++ ++ 
Dunavant; Cargill (Zambia) + Æ  + 
Atomistic Competition GLCC (Malawi) – – 
– = No credits + = good ++ = very good Æ = Development
Source: own assessments 
Ivoire Coton initially worked under a concession arrangement (monopoly) for quite 
some time and is still able to maintain strong relationships with approx. 90 per cent of 
the smallholder farmers of its former concession area under the current system of con-
centrated competition. They are therefore willing to provide 75 per cent of their farmers 
with oxen, insurance for the oxen and veterinary services (Diomande 2010, 3). This 
shows that long-term loans can be provided in systems with concentrated competition, 
provided there is a long-standing and intimate relationship between the cotton compa-
nies and the smallholder farmers.  
Plexus Mozambique offers only very limited pre-finance services even though it operates 
in a concession region and despite the general tendency of monopolistic systems to better 

12 Side selling is the act of not selling all or part of the cotton to the cotton company that pre-financed the 
harvest and instead selling to another buyer or cotton company. 
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provide farmers with input and investment loans. This shows that the organisational form 
of the sector alone does not guarantee a good performance on the part of the cotton com-
pany, even if expected in theory.13 The major reason is that systematic efforts to improve 
the performance of smallholder cotton farmer only recently began in Mozambique. 
Apart from these exceptions, our data confirm that contract farming systems with strong 
commitments between the parties create a basis for the systematic pre-financing of farm-
ers. Input supply, quality control and extension services are the first to suffer when the num-
ber of competing cotton companies rises in a certain country (Tschirley et al. 2010, 307 ff.).  
The cotton companies are probably the largest rural and agricultural microfinancers in 
their respective countries with input and investment financing combined. They have three 
advantages over traditional microfinance institutions (MFIs): (1) Transaction costs are 
low, as credit is awarded through pre-existing advisory and purchasing structures; (2) the 
credit is secured through the future delivery of cotton, provided there is no substantial side 
selling; (3) interest rates for farmers are moderate, as the cotton companies are generally 
able to refinance through local banks at favourable rates. An MFI in Côte d‘Ivoire, for 
example, which only accepts large scale farmers as customers, has to calculate an interest 
rate of 20-25 per cent to cover their costs, while the cotton company Ivoire Coton is able 
to cover its entire credit costs at 11 per cent interest.14
There are, however, disadvantages in only providing credit to farmers through the cotton 
companies. These loans are generally tied to cotton production and cannot be used to cov-
er the farmers’ other needs. These loans also increase the farmers’ dependency on the cot-
ton companies – at least for one season. For this reason, the COMPACI programme is 
working with ADAF, a non-government organisation in Cameroon, to test the introduction 
of cooperative banks for cotton farmers in northern Cameroon and in the growing areas 
around Chipata in Zambia. These banks will be refinanced exclusively through the farm-
ers’ savings. In order to secure the input and harvest pre-financing loans, the cotton com-
pany pledges to transfer the proceeds from the cotton purchased from the farmer directly 
to the farmer’s account at the cooperative bank so that the bank can directly deduct the 
repayment of the loan (see Figure 1). 
A low-cost operating concept, low refinancing costs (savings of the farmers) and close 
cooperation with the cotton company, at least during the development phase, are factors 
that can make this concept successful. Close ties to well-run local African commercial 
banks, which provide support services and monitoring, can help avoid governance and 
management problems in such village cooperative banks.15

13 Significant improvement in the support and provision of inputs to farmers has been seen since Plexus 
Mozambique joined COMPACI at the start of 2010.  
14 The noted interest rates are based on surveys by Roger Peltzer of MFI’s in December 2011 in Boundiali 
in northern Côte d’Ivoire. 
15 Compare Mees / Bomda (2006). 
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Farmers
Cotton company Village cooperative bank
Gross income
Products
Inputs
Technical assistance
Net income
Purchase of shares
Savings
Financial services,
e.g. credit
Figure 1: System for input financing through village cooperative banks 
Source: own design 
3.3 Cotton yields, farmers’ share of the cotton world market price and revenue 
Besides natural factors, high cotton yields are mainly a result of good pre-harvest service 
provision (input credit provision, especially fertiliser use and extension services), which 
are generally better provided by regulated markets, as are historically prevalent in WCA 
(see Section 3.2). As can be seen in Figure 2, there are definitely higher yields (kg/ha) in 
WCA. Nevertheless, two questions remain open: First, if and to what extent farmers in 
regulated markets receive a lower share of the world market price of cotton, and second, 
whether or not the higher yields can compensate the higher input cost. This can be ana-
lysed when comparing the net revenue of farmers.   
To add to this discussion, the authors compiled the following information based on infor-
mation provided by COMPACI partners over a period of five years: yields in kg per ha, 
farmer’s share of world market price and farmers’ net income in USD per ha.16 In the fol-
lowing discussion countries are grouped into WCA (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire) 
and ESA countries (Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia), where the hybrid sector of Benin is 
included under WCA, as it also provides extension services and input credits to the cotton 
farmers.17 This grouping does not completely fit into the organisational model of 
Tschirley. Historically, however, cotton sectors in WCA countries have been more regu 
lated and thus been able to provide mineral fertilisers to the farmers, which is (except in 
Zimbabwe) not the case in ESA countries. 

16 Yield and, consequently, income data per ha from Malawi are, however, to be regarded with caution. 
Malawi’s yield statistics are quite unreliable estimates, as cotton companies – due to the lack of contract 
relations with the farmers – cannot relate the cotton purchased to the seeds that were handed out to the 
farmers and thus to the area planted. 
17 Cameroon is not included in the following elaborations, as it is only connected with the COMPACI pro-
gramme as a public private partnership project and therefore not all of the relevant data is available. 
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Figure 2: Seed cotton productivity (kg/ha)* 
* Plexus and GLCC figures are only available since 2009/10. 
Source: COMPACI data 
Cotton Yields 
With regards to the differences in mean cotton yields per ha, the COMPACI cotton 
farmers confirm what is found in literature, namely that the mean yields in WCA are 
significantly higher than in ESA. This is due to the fact that unlike in ESA, fertiliser 
(primarily mineral fertiliser, but increasingly organic fertiliser, as well) is used for grow-
ing cotton in WCA.  
It is interesting to state that according to Tschirley et al. (2010, 312) this difference in 
yields does not mean that all farmers in ESA have low cotton yields. Their research 
found that the better off farmers in ESA (those with access to inputs, ownership of as-
sets, especially ploughing equipment and oxen) produce as much as their counterparts in 
WCA. “WCA’s advantage lies in the fact that it has through sustained effort over many 
years in research, input provision, and extension (including promoting ownership of an-
imal traction equipment), moved a much higher share of farmers into the top groups” 
(Tschirley et al. 2010, 312). Consequently assisting more farmers in increasing their 
asset base as well as enhancing their productivity is important for the competitiveness of 
a sector as well as for poverty reduction.
2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09 2007/08
Faso Coton 1066,68 846,71 802,62 691,10 690,79
Ivoire Coton 1045,23 880,91 996,66 939,99 912,63
AIC Benin 884,99 822,02 1099,45 1005,12 1147,25
Dunavant 526,65 506,82 434,09 552,28 408,92
Cargill 654,71 633,67 460,18 612,58 535,55
Plexus 515,96 407,98 336,41
GLCC 665,00 665,00 566,00
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Farmers’ share of world market prices for cotton 
When looking at the farmers’ share of world market prices for cotton, a much more com-
plex picture arises. Figure 3 shows the share of the cotton world market price received by 
farmers in the respective COMPACI countries over the past five years. As one can see 
farmers in WCA with monopolized pricing systems do not systematically receive a small-
er share of the world market price than farmers in ESA, where, with the exception of 
Mozambique, pricing depends more strongly on competition. This allows the concept of 
competition-coordination trade-off put forth by Poulton et al. (2010, 13) to be questioned.  
Figure 3: Farmers' share of world market price* 
* Plexus entered the programme only in 2009/10 and figures from ESA are not yet available for the 2011/12 season.
Source: COMPACI data 
It should, however, be noted that the cotton companies’ practice of forward selling cou-
pled with the announcement of a cotton purchase price prior to planting in WCA can go 
both ways for the farmers. When prices fall it cushions the downswing. When prices in-
crease significantly, however, the prices paid to the farmers are well under the world mar-
ket prices. Both cases can be found in Figure 8: In season 2010/11 the cotton world market 
price increased significantly from the time of the forward sale in June 2010 to the harvest 
in WCA in December/January 2011. Therefore farmers in WCA received a relatively low 
2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09 2007/08
Faso Coton 61,04% 31% 58% 66,41% 55,77%
Ivoire Coton 59,50% 31% 61% 76,06% 54,91%
AIC Benin 56,00% 30% 67% 78,11% 76,87%
Dunavant 47,06% 53% 55% 46,79% 55,88%
Cargill 43,65% 51% 60% 49,59% 60,00%
Plexus 48,12% 44% 27%
GLCC 54,74% 39% 49% 55,68% 70,27%
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2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09 2007/08
Faso Coton 210,36 178,48 184,69 167,17 183,87
Ivoire Coton 193,56 205,90 193,19 169,84 186,81
AIC Benin 193,54 178,78 193,19 172,80 190,07
Dunavant 39,50 36,80 31,85 35,09 52,55
Cargill 43,65 38,80 37,43 18,77 9,97
Plexus 17,97 22,86 19,44
GLCC 0,00 21,57 8,41 9,02 9,06
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share of the world market price in season 2010/11. However, the opposite effect can be 
seen for the 2011/12 season, as the world market price greatly decreased after the an-
nouncement of the purchase price and therefore cotton farmers in WCA received a higher 
share of world market price than their counterparts in ESA in 2011/12.
In ESA on the other hand, prices are set in closer chronological proximity to the world 
market prices, which can lead to higher shares of world market price when it is favourable, 
but also makes planning for farmers more complicated. This is an important factor to con-
sider in evaluating farmers’ share in world market prices over a longer period of time. 
Net revenue from cotton
Even more than individual components of profitability, the net revenue derived from cot-
ton is important for the farmer. The net revenue a farmer receives from cultivating cotton 
is a function of the productivity (kg/ha), the cotton price and the price he/she has to pay 
for agricultural inputs (seeds, fertiliser, chemicals). Even though labour is also an im-
portant cost factor, it is not taken into account in the following calculations for Figures 9 
and 10, as it is hard to examine and reliable figures are not available for the respective 
COMPACI countries.
Figure 4 shows the huge difference farmers pay for inputs in WCA compared to ESA. 
This is mainly due to the fact that expensive mineral fertilisers are not used in ESA (ex-
cept in Zimbabwe, which is not a COMPACI country). 
Comparing input use with the cotton productivity in Figure 2, it is clear that the inputs in 
WCA also produce higher cotton yields. Nevertheless, those higher yields do not always 
Figure 4: Input cost (USD/ha)* 
* Plexus entered the programme only in 2009/10.
Source: COMPACI data 
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lead to higher net incomes, as can be seen in Figure 5, which combines gross prices paid 
to the farmer with the deducted input cost. Here we see a rather mixed picture that shows 
that higher input cost are not always compensated by higher yields.
Figure 5: Farmers' net revenue from cotton (USD/ha)*1,*2
*1 Net incomes are calculated without labour costs. 
*2 Plexus and GLCC figures are only available since 2009/10.
Source: COMPACI data 
However, another conclusion can be drawn: The use of mineral fertiliser in WCA only 
makes sense – at least when simply looking at cotton – when farmers receive a high price 
for cotton and/or are able to achieve high yields because of very good agricultural practic-
es. The higher costs associated with using mineral fertiliser will not be compensated by 
the additional yield when low cotton prices occur combined with a low application of 
good agricultural practices.18
When interpreting the figures, it should, however, also be noted that the cotton companies 
use standard values for fertiliser costs/ha in their revenue calculations. But many farmers 
use a portion of the fertiliser for growing other crops that cover 72% of their farm area on 
average (see Section 1), especially when the prices are relatively low, which in turn leads 
to lower cotton yields. Thus, looking at the farmers’ net revenue based solely on the culti-
vation of cotton is insufficient, as their total farm production has to be taken into account. 
For this reason the total income of the cotton farmer’s household is a much more meaning-
ful figure. Statistics on the per capita income of the cotton farmers’ households were also 
gathered by COMPACI. The results can be seen in Figure 6. 

18 The same applies for the use of transgenic seed. As an additional consequence, it is advantageous for cotton 
companies and farmers if only those farmers with high yield potential use mineral fertiliser. This strategy is 
pursued by DZL, as well as Cargill in Zambia, both of which began providing mineral fertiliser on credit on-
ly for select farmers. In selecting candidates they focused on farmers with the highest yield potential. 
2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09 2007/08
Faso Coton 395,67 195,07 121,41 67,14 58,12
Ivoire Coton 370,73 182,73 195,97 187,47 122,57
AIC Benin 257,19 166,60 281,03 219,59 354,42
Dunavant 142,65 317,60 153,09 102,74 98,12
Cargill 166,38 387,65 177,30 143,28 201,92
Plexus 169,24 195,70 56,37
GLCC 278,77 510,43 208,69
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Figure 6: Per capita income and provision of assets 
Source: NORC (2011) 
The per capita income of the cotton farmers (as well as the provision of assets like motor-
cycles, bicycles and mobile telephones) is significantly higher in WCA than in ESA. It can 
be reasonably assumed that the higher living standard of cotton farmers in WCA is the 
result of the efficiency of the whole farming system in WCA, which is the result of a well 
designed cotton sector policy decades ago.
However, there are clear lessons for the optimisation of yields and input costs. Input sup-
ply should be concentrated on farmers showing high adoption rates of good agricultural 
practices. Cotton companies should furthermore design careful policies to also address the 
farmers’ needs for fertilisers for their food crop production (see Section 3.5 below). Fur-
thermore, the utilization of organic manure should be promoted. 
3.4 Price volatility – a core problem not only for farmers 
The high fluctuations of the cotton price due to the heavily fluctuating world market prices 
and exchange rates for local currencies vs. the dollar19 are seen as a major problem by the 
farmers. In contract farming arrangements in WCA this fluctuating price is balanced by 
setting the purchase price for cotton before the seed is planted (pre-planting price). This 

19 According to a study by Ecobank, the cotton price fluctuations from 2007 to 2010 by far showed the 
greatest volatility of all African soft commodities (see Aithnard 2011, 5 ff.). 
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2= Extreme outliers were removed from the average/median yield
calculations and for income and asset calculations.
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CI = Cote d‘Ivoire MZ = Mozambique
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allows farmers to calculate how much cotton they want to plant, what inputs they want to 
use and how high their potential income might be at the end of the season. Such a pre-
planting price can lead to purchase prices below world market prices at the time of har-
vest. In ESA, the purchase price is not announced until the start of the harvest and then 
often fluctuates during the two to three-month long buying season, especially in a system 
with atomistic competition. Even though a price competition initially seems favourable for 
the farmers as it allows for higher prices, it can lead to severe problems, as the following 
example illustrates: In the summer of 2010 the price of cotton doubled during the buying 
season, because the cotton companies in Zambia and Malawi entered a bidding war in 
light of a scarce harvest and rising world market prices. The farmers who sold their har-
vest early, which is desirable with regards to quality criteria, were therefore disadvan-
taged. This unequal treatment led to much discontent, something that became very clear in 
interviews with the farmers (Neubert / NORC 2010, 11 ff.; Peltzer / Neubert 2011, 473). 
More equality, even at the cost of lower prices, could be much more valuable for the social 
peace in the cotton regions. In a system of concentrated competition it is more likely that, 
pushed by the market leaders, cotton companies might agree on a more stable purchase price 
policy during the buying season, as has been the practice in Zambia since 2011. 
The strongly fluctuating world market prices not only create problems for the farmers, but 
also for the cotton companies and traders, especially in WCA, where the purchase prices 
are set prior to planting. Here, cotton companies need to forward sell at least part of the 
harvest six to 14 months in order to secure the announced price. Consequently, the cotton 
companies face significant production risks, as the forward sale occurs at a time when the 
actual production cannot be predicted. Another risk is that a counterparty – for example a 
spinning mill in China – will not fulfil the buying contract, whether under a pretext or not, 
when cotton prices decline sharply in the meantime. This also can result in a situation like 
the one seen in January 2011 in WCA. While the cotton companies in Benin and Came-
roon secured their sales prices six months before the harvest, the spinning mills in neigh-
bouring Nigeria did not buy ahead. Since the cotton price rose sharply once again between 
the time of the forward sale (June/July 2010) and harvest time in January 2011, the spin-
ning mills and gins in Nigeria were able – and had no choice but – to offer significantly 
higher prices for the cotton than the cotton companies in Benin and Cameroon were able 
to pay their farmers. Many farmers in these two countries broke their contracts and sold 
their cotton in Nigeria instead. The cotton companies in Benin and Cameroon were disad-
vantaged and were only able to fulfil their forward delivery contracts at a great effort and, 
in part, with substantial losses.  
However, the combination of pre-planting prices and cotton purchase price formulas, 
which refer to an average one-year world markets price, forces cotton companies in WCA 
to carefully balance forward sales over 12 months and longer. If this is properly done, 
market price fluctuations can be partially eliminated. Most cotton companies in ESA on 
the other hand relate their cotton purchase prices to the world market price at harvest time. 
This is a major reason why cotton companies in WCA are able to maintain a rather high 
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purchase price for the ongoing 2012/13 harvest, while cotton purchase prices in ESA 
(Zambia/Malawi) were cut by 50 per cent in 2012. 
These elaborations show that the business of buying and selling cotton and securing the 
price of cotton are linked to significant commercial risks. The advice offered by liberal 
economists to create instruments that allow farmers to forward sell more easily is prob-
lematic, as it exposes farmers to the above-named economic risks, which are now largely 
borne by the cotton companies and cotton traders. It rarely makes sense for African 
smallholder farmers to assume the significant hedging risks on the global commodity
markets.  
An open question is whether there are solutions to cushion price fluctuations. A refined 
model was established in Burkina Faso – currently the largest cotton producer in sub-
Saharan Africa – with the help of the World Bank and the French development coopera-
tion. In this model, the pre-announced purchase price for cotton is based on the average 
world market price over the last three years and on forecasted prices. If the market prices 
are higher than the announced price determined on this basis, a so-called Fonds de Lissage
is built; if the prices are below the reference price, this fund pays out a price support 
(AfdL 2008). The base capital of the Fonds de Lissage was funded by donors. Its man-
agement is assured in a very transparent way by a commercial bank, which should exclude 
mismanagement and corruption, which negatively affected former price stabilisation funds 
in many WCA countries. A final evaluation of the functionality and effect of the fund will 
not be possible until several cycles have been completed. The fund was established in 
2007 after a previously existing equalisation fund became insolvent having faced a pro-
longed period of low prices for cotton. From 2008–2010, with sharply rising world market 
prices, the equalisation mechanism in Burkina Faso initially prevented farmers from 
benefitting greatly from the increasing world market price, which gave farmers less in-
centive to grow more cotton during that time. In the 2012/13 season farmers will, how-
ever, benefit from the fund payments to stabilise a cotton purchase price higher than the 
world market price. 
A simpler option, which was chosen by several WCA governments, was to directly subsi-
dise the purchase price for cotton or fertiliser prices during phases with low world market 
cotton prices with budget funds. These were refinanced through donor funds.
Another way to assist farmers to cope with price fluctuation risks is to train them in basic 
commercial practices – if possible integrated with functional literacy programmes – so 
that they are capable of optimising their overall operations, which generally entail an aver-
age of four to five crops, vegetable farming and small scale trading and tradesmen activi-
ties. From a commercial perspective it could then make sense to reduce cotton planting 
during periods in which low prices are anticipated. However, since cotton is much more 
resistant to drought than corn, it is always sensible for farmers to grow at least a minimal 
amount of cotton as part of an adequate insurance strategy for securing their income 
against weather related risks.
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3.5 The cultivation of cotton versus food crops 
There is a vast discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of cash crop production 
vs. the production of food crops in literature. In general, opponents of cash crop produc-
tion are concerned that cash crops compete with food crops for scarce land and that with 
increasing cash crop production farmers produce less food crops, which can lead to a 
rise of prices in local food markets (Jayne et al. 2004, 210; Kiriti / Tisdell 2003, 442). 
However, proponents of cash crops state that specific cash crop arrangements are able to 
establish access to inputs and thereby intensify food crop production and that, even 
without specific arrangements, food crop production benefits from cash crops through 
crop rotation and residual fertiliser of the cash crops in the soil (Brüntrup 1997; Govereh 
et al. 1999, 31; Govereh / Jayne 2003, 41; Demont / Stessens 2009, 260 ff.). Based on 
this discussion and the fact that most smallholder cotton farmers also produce food for 
their own consumption, it is important to examine whether cotton production favours 
food production or not, as well as which sector organisational model can best support 
food crop production and how. 
In COMPACI countries cotton is generally grown under the practice of rainfed agricul-
ture and in rotation with other crops. Therefore, food crops can benefit from residual 
fertilisers in all organisational models, but especially in countries where contract farm-
ing models that provide fertiliser for cotton exist, e.g. WCA countries. In fact, in many 
WCA countries cotton is the only agricultural value chain that can provide millions of 
farmers not only with fertiliser, but also with other inputs for agricultural production, as 
well as with investment goods like oxen and agricultural equipment. This also benefits 
the farmers’ other crops, as fertiliser, pesticides, draught animals and equipment are also 
used for growing other crops. This is not possible in more competitive organisational 
models, where contract farming arrangements that pre-finance inputs cannot be main-
tained.  
Due to this interdependency of cotton and food crop production in WCA, phases with 
low prices for cotton not only lead to a reduced production of cotton, but also to reduced 
food crop production in the cotton farming regions of WCA (Poulton et al. 2010, 6; Bel-
locq / Silve 2007, 5 f.). In this respect, it can be said that promoting cotton production 
also directly increases the security of the food supply in those countries.
When taking a closer look at the management of fertiliser loans, however, which are 
intended for the cultivation of cotton but also used for other crops, many problems can 
be observed. The fact that many farmers have given grossly exaggerated estimations of 
the surface area to be used for cotton cultivation during phases with low cotton prices in 
order to receive fertiliser and chemicals for other crops has proven to be very problemat-
ic. As a result, farmers who grow a lot of food crops and only little cotton during these 
phases were unable to pay back the input loans with cotton and accumulated considera-
ble outstanding debts. The situation was further complicated through the practice of joint 
liability in the cooperative system, in which honest farmers were required to pay for the 
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“dishonest” debtors. As a result the accumulation of old debts took away all incentive 
for farmers to grow cotton, as they feared that a large portion of their earnings would be 
withheld for the payment of these debts. These mechanisms ultimately contributed to 
fuelling the crisis in the cotton sector and to an equal further reduction of both cotton 
and food crop production.
Based on this experience, three models for promoting the cultivation of both cotton and 
food crops without putting the farmers at risk of over indebtedness are being tested or 
already in place in some countries of WCA. The central idea for the cotton companies is 
to secure the loyalty of the farmers with a minimal level of cotton production even dur-
ing phases of low cotton prices. Additionally, the practice of crop rotation has to be en-
couraged from an agronomical point of view, as it contributes to the preservation of soil 
fertility and to combat parasites.  
(1) The Ivorian cotton company Ivoire Coton records all 40,000 contract farmers work-
ing with them in a detailed database that focuses on all land farmed by theses farmers for 
any crop. Ivoire Coton is able to use their knowledge of the yields and prices to gain 
relatively precise insight into their farmers’ earnings and the cash costs, which result 
almost entirely from the inputs provided by Ivoire Coton. This allows Ivoire Coton to 
determine the debt capacity for each farmer and to adjust the delivered inputs (including 
amounts beyond that needed for cotton). In this respect Ivoire Coton is looking at the 
farmer’s overall operations and not just the production of cotton. The farmers profit 
from the affordable prices and terms of payment that Ivoire Coton is able to obtain 
through international tenders for fertilisers and pesticides. Ivoire Coton did away with 
the policy of joint liability among farmers with the introduction of this system. Farmers 
who do not pay back their loans do not receive future loans. Debts are restructured in 
cases of weather-induced failed harvests.  
(2) Sodecoton in Cameroon has a slightly different approach. They also provide inputs 
to farmers, but the fertilisers for cotton are charged differently than those for food crops 
(maize, sorghum). While the fertilisers for cotton are delivered without a down payment 
and are paid for through the delivery of cotton, the farmers must make a down payment 
of 30 per cent in cash for the fertilisers that will be used for food crops. Theoretically, 
the input credits for food crops will also be refunded by the revenues of those food crops 
or other revenue rather than coming from cotton in order to ease the burden on cotton, 
but this often does not work in practice. Therefore the amount of inputs given for food 
crops depends on the area under cotton cultivation and the precedent campaign’s cotton 
yield per hectare. If the precedent campaign’s productivity (kg/ha) of a specific farmer 
was under a defined threshold, no inputs for food crops will be given. In addition, for 
one hectare of cotton, a farmer can only obtain inputs for up to one hectare of sorghum 
or for 0.25 – 0.5 hectares of maize. The granted credits are group credits handed out to 
the cooperatives – if one farmer cannot pay back his credit the others will do so in his 
place. In contrast to Ivoire Coton, Sodecoton does not look into the farmers’ debt ratio 
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under this system. However, Sodecton is also currently looking into changing from 
group to individual credits and taking the individual farmer’s debt ratio into account. 
(3) Another new development is seen in the parallel promotion of cotton and soy cultiva-
tion by some cotton companies (Sodecoton in Cameroon and, to a limited extent, DZL 
and Cargill in Zambia). This is a particularly meaningful practice for crop rotation, as 
soy returns the nitrogen to the soil that the cotton consumes. From an economic stand-
point, this is particularly interesting for the cotton companies that also operate seed cot-
ton crushing oil mills. They are then able to supply these mills with both cottonseed and 
soy. Under this model, soy, like cotton, is planted and harvested under contract farming. 
Since cooking oil is central to securing the food supply and the remaining oilcake a val-
uable animal feed, this is also an example of how the cultivation of cotton and food 
crops can be sensibly intertwined (Clavier 2010).
In general it can be said that a debate of “cash crops versus food crops” does not reflect 
a real alternative and does not really help in the search for solutions for smallholder Af-
rican farmers. It is much more important to discuss ways of sensibly linking the promo-
tion of cash crops for export with the cultivation of food crops for local markets and 
subsistence production. This also applies to other major African cash crops, namely 
palm oil, coffee and cocoa, all of which are primarily cultivated by smallholder farmers 
who always combine the production of cash crops with the production of food crops. 
The solutions that must be developed for combining cash crop and food crop promotion 
will, however, be sector-specific and vary as contract farming arrangements are less 
prevalent in the coffee and cacao sector.
3.6 Environmental and social standards in cotton farming 
While the cultivation of coffee and the working conditions in the textile (sewing) com-
panies have long been a topic in the public debates that have led to environmental and 
social standards, public awareness for the development of standards for cotton farming is 
a more recent phenomenon. Fair Trade cotton from Africa has been available since 
2007, the Cotton made in Africa (CmiA) and Better Cotton Initiative (BCI) standards 
were both founded in 2005.20 The production of organic cotton is the only standard with 
a significantly longer history. Although the world market share of all four of the above 
named standards is still small and well under 2 per cent, many major retailers have is-
sued declarations of intent to completely switch to textiles that have been produced with 
sustainable cotton in the next five to eight years (Engel 2011, 12). Therefore, it is im-
portant to assess which form of cotton sector organisation is best prepared to implement 
environmental and social standards. 

20  More information on Fair Trade cotton can be found at Fairtrade Foundation (2012), on BCI at BCI 
(2012) and on CmiA at CmiA (2012a). 
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While BCI, Fairtrade Labelling Organization (FLO) and bio cotton have been of little im-
portance in Africa thus far,21 CmiA was able to boast more than 483,180 verified farmers 
with a production of more than 176,400 tons of lint cotton in the 2011/12 cultivation peri-
od (AbTF 2012a).22
Those seeking to establish environmental and social standards for African cotton used to 
produce textiles for the mass market face the following challenges:  
- The standard must be practical and build on the reality of the production conditions of 
hundreds of thousands of smallholder farmers and help to gradually improve these 
conditions.
- The standard must be credible and be able to withstand external scrutiny.
- The costs of verifying the standard must be reasonable in relation to the farmers’ in-
come. If an African farmer has an average net income of 232 EUR23 per ha of cotton 
(see Figure 10), the verification costs per farmer cannot amount to 20-30 EUR.  
- The development of standards cannot be an end in and of itself, but rather must be 
integrated in a process that allows for the living conditions of the cotton farmers to 
gradually improve.  
The example of CmiA shows that contract farming arrangements, which are only possi-
ble in a concession or concentrated competition model, are most suitable for meeting 
these challenges. Accreditation to CmiA starts with a few key exclusion criteria (such as 
the worst forms of child labour or farming in nature reserves). A traffic light criteria 
system focusing on gradually improving the social and environmental criteria is an addi-
tional integral part of CmiA. Starting in 2013 CmiA will also allow surpluses from the 
licensing fee revenue to be invested in the cotton farming regions for the twofold pur-
pose of improving the environmental effects of cotton production and to improve the 
living conditions of the farmers.24 To ensure the efficiency of the verification system, 
the cotton companies, as contract partners, bear most of the responsibility for ensuring 

21 BCI cotton was grown by app. 4,000 farmers in Mali in the 2010/2011 growing season (see Proforest 
Initiative 2011, 38). According to FLO-CERT, FLO cotton is grown in Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal and 
Cameroon (see FLO-CERT 2011). According to the knowledge of the authors, Fair Trade cotton is cur-
rently only purchased from a few thousand farmers in Senegal. In the 2009/10 growing season 14,481 
tons of bio cotton were grown by 31,069 farmers in the countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia (see Truscott et al. 2010, 16 f.).  
22 However, only approx. 5 per cent of this verified cotton is sold under the CmiA label at present (see Pelt-
zer / Neubert 2011, 472). As CmiA cotton since is allowed to also be marketed under BCI May 2012, it 
profits from a strongly increasing demand for BCI cotton, which will most probably absorb 50 per cent of 
all verified CmiA cotton in the upcoming 2–3 years.  
23 Here and in the following, net income refers to cotton income per ha in USD minus input costs (for seed, 
fertiliser, pesticides). Labour costs and any other costs are not included in the calculations. This figure re-
fers to the 2010/2011 cultivation period.  
24 A detailed portrayal of the CmiA criteria matrix can be found at: Aid by Trade Foundation (2012b) and at 
CmiA (2012b).  
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that the exclusion criteria are adhered to and that the performance criteria are fulfilled 
step-by-step. Under this system the cotton companies must clearly document the efforts 
made to improve the fulfilment of the criteria and prove that appropriate management 
plans are in place. On this basis the independent verifiers are generally able to determine 
if and to what degree the cotton company’s claims are true based on interviews with a 
limited number of farmers.  
One advantage in this approach of using cotton companies operating under contract 
farming is that it clearly defines actors of responsibility (change agents). During the se-
lection process, cotton companies being considered as possible new partners for CmiA 
are assessed based on the degree to which they are willing and able to successfully man-
age the necessary change processes in cooperating with tens of thousands of smallholder 
farmers. If the verification process shows that certain criteria are not being met, the cot-
ton companies must either improve in those areas or risk losing their CmiA verification.  
Furthermore, relying on cotton companies with well established systems of contract 
farming allows for the cost-effective and widespread introduction of “new production” 
methods, which help improve the performance level under the CmiA criteria matrix. 
These methods might include the application of pesticides according to damage thresh-
old principle (Integrated Pest Management [IPM]); the creation and use of compost pits; 
ground and water conservation techniques; the use of stonewalls to protect against ero-
sion; the introduction of minimal tillage; switching from backpack sprayers (high water 
consumption) to Ulva sprayers (low water consumption) and the planting of nitrogen 
fixing cultures. The well-run cotton companies and their extension services are able to 
quickly and appropriately react to the problems that inevitably occur when “innovations” 
are introduced. For example, the introduction of minimal tillage in Zambia has been ac-
companied by a significant increase in weed growth. This technique will only find wide-
spread acceptance among farmers if they are also provided with the herbicides needed to 
combat weed growth on a credit basis. Private cotton companies with a sufficient credit 
rating are able to react to such needs by the following season. 
Unlike CmiA, FLO and BCI have thus far worked almost exclusively with farmers’ or-
ganisations and local NGOs as partners in implementing their standards. As both the 
BCI and FLO farmers are contractually bound to the cotton companies, it is not uncom-
mon that situations arise in which it is unclear who, i.e. the farmers organisation on field 
level, the implementing NGO or the cotton company, bears the responsibility for remov-
ing shortcomings or for the continuous improvement process every standard pursues. 
For this reason, Fair Trade and BCI are rethinking their approach so that the cotton 
companies in Africa will play a significantly greater role in implementing their respec-
tive standards criteria in the future.25

25 Discussions between the author Roger Peltzer with officials from BCI and FLO at the COMPACI and 
CmiA Stakeholder Conference in Livingstone / Zambia from 12–14 October 2011.  
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4 Conclusion: a comparison of organisational forms of the cotton sector 
This paper showed that the cotton sector is an important part of agriculture in sub-Saharan 
Africa that offers good starting points for targeted policies for combating poverty, secur-
ing the food supply and for implementing environmentally-friendly farming methods. Dif-
ferent organisation models exist that offer different advantages and disadvantages, as was 
shown throughout Section 3. 
Comparing the different models and their outcomes shows that there is no ideal system for 
organising the cotton sector that is systematically more suitable to meet all needs than an 
alternative model (Delpuche / Leblois 2011, 13 f.; Poulton et al. 2010, 7). However, mod-
els which allow for contract farming do meet most of the criteria that indicate a high per-
formance.  
The monopoly/concession model is inherently more prone to mismanagement and corrup-
tion, even when counterbalanced by strong farmers’ associations. However, this model has 
shown some strength regarding the provision of agricultural inputs and price stability. 
Companies like Sodecoton in Cameroun and Sodefitex in Senegal are also the only one’s 
which significantly invested in the maintenance of the seed quality over the last years. 
Contract farming arrangements that are organised under a monopolistic system in WCA 
also show that there are promising experiences in a productive connection between cash 
crops and food production and the introduction of environmental and social standards.  
Countries that choose to use a concession model should, however, define clear perfor-
mance indicators that must be met in order for licenses to be renewed.26 This requires first 
and foremost that private and parastatal companies report publicly and transparently on 
their performance (number of contracted farmers, ha yields, gross profit/ha, production 
figures), something that has not often been the case.27
The concentrated competition model as practiced in Côte d’Ivoire and Zambia is becom-
ing more important in sub-Saharan Africa. The better the state’s definition of the rules in a 
system with co-regulation with the private sector and the better the state monitors adher-
ence to the regulations or sanctions non-compliance, the sooner that system will be able to 
show its full strengths. For example, only gins that provide a minimal amount (to be de-
fined) of advisory services and provide input pre-financing should be awarded a new li-
cense or the renewal of an existing license. Compliance with the terms of contract must be 
guaranteed and side selling prevented. The farmers would only be allowed to change part-
ners, meaning cotton companies, after the season or after they have paid back investment 

26 Situations rarely arise in which decisions can be made on issuing licenses to newcomers. When awarding 
licenses for set time periods, it would be logical to only lease the cotton gins “going along with the li-
cense” for set periods (such as five years). This allows more flexibility in issuing new licenses based on 
poor performance.   
27 For example, the information policy of Sofitex (parastatal) in Burkina Faso, which is the largest cotton 
producer in sub-Saharan Africa along with the CMDT in Mali, has been not always very transparent in 
recent years.  
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loans, which may last for a period of several years. The contracts can be monitored with a 
uniform data file, in which all cotton companies enter their contracts with the farmers, 
which would also help prevent “double contracts” and “side-selling”. Such a data base has 
been installed by all ginners in Zambia in 2011 and it already exists in Côte d’Ivoire. The 
improved cooperation between the parties in the cotton sector in Zambia is already leading 
companies like Dunavant and Cargill to slowly explore the expensive pre-financing of 
mineral fertiliser and the granting of investment loans to farmers. This should lead to a 
significant increase in the average harvest yields of Zambian cotton production once these 
developments can be consolidated. Such a partly private and partly state regulated system 
will be then also able to implement a productive cooperation between cash and food crops, 
as well as environmental and social standards.
The atomistic competition model shows massive deficits. This is due to the fact that it 
does not offer any opportunity for the farmers’ productivity to be systematically increased 
through the provision of inputs or advisory services. Due to the very high pre-financing 
costs for genetically modified seed, the free competition model is also not suitable for in-
troducing transgenic cotton. Sustainability standards like CmiA, BCI and Fair Trade are 
also very difficult to implement in a system with atomistic competition, as these standards 
require traceability and the implementation of their criteria by tens of thousands of farm-
ers. This can only be done through cooperation with management partners who systemati-
cally and contractually register and support these masses of farmers.  
Under the model with atomistic competition, the introduction of a tax (levy) on all cotton 
exports could be a feasible solution to dealing with part of the deficits. This tax could be 
used to give the inputs “free of charge” to the farmers. Such a model exists in Uganda. 
Such a tax was introduced in Malawi in the 2011/12 season. The disadvantages of a tax 
are that the farmers lose their incentive to use external production inputs efficiently, which 
they perceive as being offered for free. Since inputs are financed “invisibly” through the 
sector, the smallholder farmer has no way of understanding how much it costs to grow 
cotton (compared to growing other products) or how much profit he/she makes with cot-
ton. This system also implies that inputs and agricultural advisory services must be pro-
vided or organised by the state. Past experiences leave room for significant doubt as to 
how efficient and transparent this can be done in SSA. The state must also make advance 
payments until the tax is fully functional and bear significant commercial risks should the 
forecasted cotton production figures not be realized. The Malawian government just real-
ised that it will only recover 50 per cent of the pre-financing they provided for cotton in-
puts in 2011 with the levy cashed in 2012 (Socotec 2012). 
Whatever the organisational model, the state can and should delegate many tasks to pri-
vate parties, but the selection and monitoring of these parties must be subject to strict cri-
teria and the state should be able to sanction those who do not provide the agreed services. 
In addition to government regulation, international standards such as CmiA, contribute to 
bringing cotton companies and farmers to cooperate with each other on an equal level. For 
example, the CmiA criteria catalogue contains requirements for the setting of purchase 
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and input prices, as well as the terms of payment for the farmers. Wide-reaching develop-
mental impacts can thus be achieved in the cotton sector through the interaction of ade-
quate regulation and international standards. Potential donor support should be structured 
to stimulate such interaction in the cotton sector.
In conclusion, Tschirley et al. (2010, 317 ff.) and Poulton et al. (2010, 7) can be supported 
in their statement that there is no one-size-fits-all solution regarding the optimal organisa-
tional form of the cotton sector. Those involved would instead be well advised to continue 
to develop further existing systems in an incremental way instead of experimenting with 
radical alternatives, as:  
“... feasible reform paths depend on a country’s previous experience. Attempted rapid 
change from an established system to one with dramatically different behavioral un-
derpinnings, even if the new system holds the prospect of improved performance if 
“properly” implemented is a risky undertaking that could instead reduce perfor-
mance for long periods”. (Poulton et al. 2010, 7)
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